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I – The Company, the Market and its current situation 
Vestas Wind Systems A/S is the largest wind turbine manufacturer in the world. It has 
installed over 60GW of wind power capacity through more than 51,000 turbines in 73 
countries throughout its 30 years of experience
i
. The Danish group initially manufactured 
household appliances and produced its first wind turbine in 1971: a 10-meter rotor and 30KW 
machine. Nowadays, its latest turbine is the V164, 164m rotor and a 8MW generator. 
Vestas merged with Danish wind turbine manufacturer NEG Micon in 2003 to create the 
world leader in wind turbines manufacturing: Vestas Wind Systems A/S. In 2006 it controlled 
28% of the market share and, despite still being the market leader and having significantly 
increased its output, it saw its market share fall to 13.1% in 2013
ii
 amidst increasing external 
competition. Its main competitors are China’s Xinjiang Goldwind, Germany’s Enercon and 
Siemens and the US’s GE, whose market shares are shown in appendix 1. 
 In the past 15 years Vestas has only lost its leading position in 2012, in the aftermath of a 
terrible financial and operational year, dictated by the overwhelming external competition and 
internal challenges. Acknowledging these challenges, it underwent a 2-year restructuring plan 
which entailed refocusing its operating business model towards its core area of turbine 
manufacturing, divesting in non-core businesses and improving capital efficiency and 
capacity utilisation. This included reducing its factories from 31 to 19 in just two years 
(appendix 2). Its current CEO, Anders Runevad, was brought in amidst these changes in 2013. 
Most importantly, it has been optimizing its operations through cost reductions, which 
included a trimming of its workforce from 22,700 in 2011 to below 16,000 in 2013 and 
reducing CAPEX from €761M to €239M in the same periodiii.  
Vestas’ 2013 performance marks its turnaround: its market cap soared, its ROIC was 7.7% 
(compared to 0.2% the previous year) and customer orders of over 6GW – compared to 
3.8GW in 2012. Financials for Vestas are shown in appendix 3. As it stands, its current 
ultimate goal is “achieving cost leadership within the wind power industry”iv, which can be 
observed in appendix 4 with the reduction of its average selling price in 2013.  
Going forward, as the energy market increasingly shifts towards Asia, some of the industry’s 
main strutctural questions are the gaps in supply and demand for energy, the level of 
government support (GE’s fall in market share in 2013 was almost exclusively due to lower 
wind subsidies in the US
v
), improvements in technology and the cost of other sources of 
energy (also dependent on subsidies given
vi
).  
For the medium-term, foreseeable changes include the emergence of offshore wind capacity
vii
, 
the replacement of old power plants in Europe and the US
viii
 and the widening gap in 
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electricity generation between OECD and non-OECD countries, as is portrayed in appendices 
5 and 6. The wind market is forecasted to grow between 4 to 10% CAGR, according to 
different estimates
ix
. The IEA projects 4,500GW of extra capacity is required worldwide by 
2030 to meet demand, through the rebuilding of old plants in developed economies and heavy 
investments in new grid and capacity infrastructure in emerging markets
x
. 
Vestas’ goals are set to keep pace with these changes: “Bringing wind on par with oil and 
gas”. It wants to reduce the levelised cost of energy, improve its operational efficiency and 
achieve stable growth in both emerging and developed markets, leveraging on its large scale 
operations, its strong brand and exclusive focus on wind energy. 
The Business Project and Summary of Conclusions 
The Business Project (BP) proposed by Vestas was “Launching Wind for Prosperity Initiative 
in Asia Pacific”. The BP’s goal was for the team to identify major target markets in the Asia 
Pacific region for Vestas’ CSR program Wind for Prosperity (WfP). The initiative consists on 
deploying refurbished KW-class turbinesxi in a wind-diesel solution to remote (off-grid) 
communities in this region, while still generating attractive returns for local investors. These 
wind sites will then be operated by local Independent Power Producers (IPPs).  
The challenge for the group was to identify suitable markets and investors for launching this 
project in the Asia Pacific region. This was divided into three stages, as shown in appendix 7: 
(1) identify countries with best wind potential from initial list of 29 countries (2) select 
optimal wind-sites for shortlisted countries and (3) identify 3-4 potential investors per 
selected country, indicating the rationale for investing in WfP. In all stages it was up to the 
team to identify the most suitable approach, with a preliminary meeting with Vestas to guide 
our efforts and clarify our doubts regarding the technicalities of each phase. 
The deliverables of the BP were of a qualitative nature – recommendations made on behalf of 
the Team to Vestas based on our own selection criteria and analysis of market context and 
conditions. Our recommendation consisted on a final shortlist of five target countries for WfP: 
India, Pakistan, Myanmar, Philippines and Vietnam. In each of these countries the Team 
identified 4 tier 1 potential investors and several tier 2 investors for Vestas’ consideration, 
based on company size, sector, history of CSR programs, location of operations and other 
several criteria. A summary table can be found in appendix 8. This final stage was the most 
complex as it entailed broad knowledge of a whole country to establish the best potential 
investors. Given the time constraints, the team focused on an approach based on financial 
markets to identify and then filter the top candidates. The focus of this WP will look onto 
other approaches to further complement the process in identifying in-country opportunities. 
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II – Development of a specific topic: Profitability and Feed-in-Tariff analysis of WfP 
Originally, the plan for the BP entailed four stages, the last of which was later eliminated due 
to time constrains. This final stage consisted on analysing the wind feed-in-tariffs (FIT) and 
current renewable energy (RE) policy landscape to determine the financial feasibility of WfP 
in each of the selected countries. Considering this shortcoming of our BP, this WP looks to 
complement the work already done to deepen the understanding of the policy environment for 
feed-in-tariff implementation (with in-depth analysis for the Philippines) and add an 
altogether new analysis about the sensitivity of WfP’s returns to FIT and capacity. 
The analysis will be divided into three sections. Firstly an overview of the energy conditions 
in Southeast Asia and recent developments in terms of policies. Secondly, a detailed outlook 
for the Philippines will be provided including (a) the main players and issues of their energy 
sector and (b) the recent changes in terms of RE policy. Lastly, a financial analysis will be 
provided for the Wind for Prosperity business case in the Philippines. 
My goal in this main section of the WP is to complement, enhance and even add upon what 
was developed during the BP. Ultimately, this WP’s analysis should add value towards the 
implementation of Wind for Prosperity. To achieve this, I coordinated the analyses directly 
with Vestas’ representative to know what questions still needed answering.  
Southeast Asia’s energy landscape 
Energy demand and generation in Southeast Asia (along with China and India) have evolved 
greatly since the 1990s, to the point where they are becoming the highest potential energy 
market in the world. Huge differences are present between the ten ASEAN members yet, 
overall, they are countries with low electrification rates, distorted electricity/energy price 
markets and with a high share of renewable in the primary power generation mix (24%, 
almost double of the world average)xii. Energy demand in ASEAN is projected to grow at 
more than double the speed of global demand until 2035, meaning an additional 300GW of 
capacity will need to be added to the 176GW of already installed capacity as of 2011xiii.  
Renewable energy’s installed capacity accounts for approximately 43GW in 2012 and is 
expected to increase to 130GW in 2035. The most developed renewable sources of energy are 
hydropower (given abundant resources available, namely near the Greater Mekong Sub 
region) and biomass (since the low electrification rates and poor grid access dictate that 
several people resort to biomass for cooking and other basic needs). 
The Philippines market is an outlier amidst the typical ASEAN energy markets, since it 
underwent a major restructuring and privatization which began in the late 1990s. Despite still 
resorting to some fossil-fuel subsidization to protect its population from strong price hikes, it 
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does not provide any electricity price subsidies and spends a much lower percentage of GDP 
than countries in the region (appendix 9). It has therefore created favourable conditions for the 
competitiveness of renewable energies and innovative fuel efficiency technology. There have 
been several efforts on behalf of other ASEAN members to implement subsidy reforms yet 
have proven insufficient. As of 2012, fossil-fuel subsidies amounted to $51b with 68% going 
to oil and 24% going to electricity as is shown in appendix 10. 
On a separate note, it is interesting and worth observing the correlation between the Energy 
Self-Sufficiency Index and the expenditure on fossil-fuel subsidies shown in appendix 11. 
Although there are notable exceptions, namely due to different sizes of GDP – China and 
India’s undershoot the magnitude of their fossil-fuels while Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan’s 
small economies overshoot it –, we can observe that countries with a higher degree of fuel-
dependency will spend less in fossil-fuel subsidies as a share of GDP. This may be explained 
by the monetary constraints of a fuel-importing economy and by the fact that by subsidizing 
these fuels more, they would be deteriorating even further the sustainability of their energy 
conditions in the future. This perspective could be seen as an alternative to identify candidates 
for Wind for Prosperity and other green energy initiatives.  
Another important aspect to characterise the energy landscape in Southeast Asia is the energy 
and RE policies in this region. There are significant differences among the countries but, 
according to IEA’s WEO 2013, you find common goals relating with increasing power 
generation capacity and increasing the share of RE in the primary generation mix. A 
summarizing table can be found in appendix 12. In the countries with sub-par grid 
electrification, the respective energy authorities are also promoting ambitious electrification 
programs. Examples of this are Cambodia (70% household grid electrification by 2030), 
Indonesia (99% household electricity access by 2020), Laos (household electrification to 80% 
by 2015) and the Philippines (90% household electrification rate by 2017).  
The analysis means to provide a broad perspective on the energy landscape in Southeast Asia 
before analysing the Philippines specifically. Most importantly, it adds an extra dimension 
and perspective to what was done during the first two stages of the BP. These stages were 
done mostly following Vestas’ instructions and didn’t directly contemplate the future 
environment of energy in SEA, focusing instead on the country-ranking indicators (stage 1) 
and on the wind conditions to select the sites (stage 2); in that sense, it provides a 
contextualizing bridge between stage 2 and 3, before entering the investor selection 
exclusively. The following section looks to shed light on the demand-gap in the Filipino 
energy sector regarding RE facilities and the fiscal and operational (Feed-in-tariffs) in place. 
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Energy Sector in the Philippines 
The Filipino energy sector has undergone significant changes in the last 20 years. Since the 
late 1990s a series of deregulatory measures and privatization process began. The enactment 
of the Electric Power Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA), formulated by the Department of Energy 
(DOE) was the culmination of this process, setting the ground for the reform and restructuring 
of the whole sector. The DOE, alongside the National Power Corporation (NPC) who until 
then was responsible for power generation, transmission and distribution services across the 
Philippines, created the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation 
(PSALM) to be the vehicle of reform and gradual privatization of the state-owned facilities. 
As of December 2012, PSALM has privatized more than 70% of the total generation capacity 
held initially held by NPC, totalling 4.6GW. Before EPIRA and since the early 1990s, the 
Philippines already showed a successful history of privatizing power generation through 
Independent Power Producers (IPPs), which is especially propitious for Wind for Prosperity 
given its IPP-based business model.   
As it stands, the Philippines presents Today power generation is done by several players, the 
biggest of which is still state-owned NPC and PSALM (24% market share), followed by San 
Miguel Energy Corp (20%), Aboitiz Power Corp (17%) and First Gen/First Gas (17%). 
Mindanao (one of the three regions of the Philippines) is the least privatized energy market, 
with NPC and PSALM controlling 79% of the market, counting only with Aboitiz Power as 
the main private player (18%). The two other regions, Luzon and Visayas, are now fairly 
competitive markets with atleast five different private players supplying power. Appendix JJ 
portrays the main players in each region.  
All these players are potential targets for Wind for Prosperity, many of which were identified 
in the BP. What the BP does not include are the players of the Transmission and Distribution 
networks which, considering the electrification targets proposed by the DOE and the scope of 
WfP, may also be potential targets not just for CSR purposes but also to achieve important 
milestones. Transmission is currently done by the National Grid Corporation of the 
Philippines (privately-owned), who owns a 25-year concession which began in 2008. Its main 
goal is to fight off the recurrent power outages (most frequent in Mindanao) and improve 
inter-island grid connectivity across the country.  
Power distribution is done by regional electric cooperatives, most of which are privately 
owned by power generating companies. The largest one is MERALCO, which serves the 
Metro Manila area, and the second largest is VECO, which serves the Cebu metro area, the 
country’s second largest city.  
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As of May 2013, installed capacity in the Philippines is 17,025 MW, with wind energy 
accounting for a mere 33MWxiv. The high electricity prices established by the market through 
the WESMxv, driven mostly due to high generation prices (due to expensive fuel imports) and 
the inexistence of electricity subsidies are behind the Philippines’ push to adopting alternative 
energy sources and their ambitious RE targets to be discussed below. As of 31st January 
2014, the DOE had awarded a total of 1849.5MW in potential capacity to wind projects in 
Luzon and Visayasxvi, including an 87MW site in North Luzon to be supplied by Vestas and 
begin operations by 2015.  
The Philippine Energy Plan 2012-2030 (launched Dec. 2013) is the most important energy 
policy currently in place with the main goals of fighting power shortages and respond to rising 
demand in the future. Its main goal is to increase the country’s installed capacity from 
17.025GW as of May 2013xvii to approximately 26GW by 2030. Even so, demand is projected 
to exceed 29GW. Another key policy for WfP is the Renewable Energy Act of 2008, which 
established two essential targets: achieve 90% rural electrification rate by 2017 (it stands at 
80.18% as of September 2013xviii) and increase the renewable generation capacity to 15.3GW 
by 2030. While the RE target will be mostly met through geothermal and hydropower 
capacity – the country’s largest renewable resources – wind power also has a specific target of 
2.345GW of installed capacity and of achieving grid parity – levelized cost of production 
being the same as buying power directly from the electricity grid – by the same year.  
Another measure of the RE Act of 2008 was the implementation of feed-in-tariffs (FITs) for 
renewable energy sources. In July 2012 the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) approved 
FIT for hydro, biomass, wind and solar energy (appendix 13). The wind tariff was set at 8.53 
PHP/kWh (0.138 EUR/kWh) fixed for the first 20 years of the project and applicable until the 
goal of 200MW of capacity has been fulfilled.  
Amidst such a deregulated and competitive energy sector as the Filipino one, the 
implementation of the FIT for renewable energies is done with caution to minimize distortions 
and loss of competitiveness. In fact, the tariffs approved by the ERC for solar and wind were 
significantly lower than the ones originally proposed by the National Renewable Energy 
Board, to reflect the downward trend in construction costs for these types of plants. 
Furthermore, the ERC will periodically (every 3 years) readjust the tariffs according to 
current costs. Even so, compared to countries with similar FIT schemes, the Philippines 
present the second most attractive tariffs after Sri Lanka, as is shown in appendix 14. 
Lastly, the RE Act of 2008 promotes a series of fiscal and non-fiscal incentives which can 
further enhance the attractiveness of a RE project for a potential investor. Certified developers 
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of renewable energy facilities will have income tax holiday for seven years, duty-free 
importation of RE machinery, equipment and materials, a corporate tax rate of 10% on its net 
taxable income after 7 years, 0% VAT rate on sale of power generated among other 
incentives. Manufacturers and suppliers of the RE equipment also benefit from tax and duty 
free importation of components and materials needed for the manufacturing. 
Feed in Tariff analysis for Wind for Prosperity 
Having understood the conditions of the Filipino energy market, the policies in place and the 
incentives to undertake a project such as Wind for Prosperity, we now look at the financials of 
the project. The question to be answered is if a project such as Wind for Prosperity is feasible 
under the conditions available regarding FIT, and how it affects the project’s profitability. 
The analysis that follows was done under guidance from Vestas and based on two documents: 
(A) a sample financial model including FIT provided by the DOE of the Philippines and (B) a 
benchmark project economics sheet with the technical, operational and financial requirements 
for the two types of turbines being used in WfP (V27-225kW and V47-660kW). The process 
consisted on adapting the model in document A with the information contained in document 
B, to obtain the financial projections for Wind for Prosperity plants in the Philippines.  
Among the several inputs required for the model to work, the two main inputs which are the 
anchor for the analysis are two: installed capacity of the facility (stemming from the number 
of turbines per site) and the FIT. The base case is a facility with two turbines and a fixed-rate 
FIT of 8.53 PHP/kWh. Consequently, the capacity of a V27 facility is 0.45MW and a V47 
one will have 1.32MW. Other relevant inputs for each turbine are summarized in appendix 15. 
Under the base case, the V27 facility generates an IRR of 20% and the V47 one reaches 
45.2%. 
For the sensitivity analysis, I considered a range of 1 to 10 V27-225kW turbines, resulting in 
a capacity of 0.225 to 2.25MW. Regarding the V47-660kW facilities, a WfP facility would 
have 1 to 5 units resulting in a gross capacity of 0.66 to 3.3MW. This capacity constraint 
reflects the fact that a WfP facility will have a maximum capacity of approximately 2MW, 
according to Vestas. The range for the feed-in-tariff was from 5 to 10 PHP/kWh. The range is 
skewed negatively around the base of 8.53 PHP/kWh since the FIT of the Philippines is, as 
has been said previously, higher than normal in the region therefore there is limited room to 
lobby for a further increase. Regarding the output of the analysis, the IRR of the project, the 
target by Vestas is 18% to be on par with the wind projects it conducted in the region. A range 
between 13 to 18% would also still be acceptable in the scope of WfP, as it aims to not only 
be a sustainable and profitable business but to bring power to off-grid regions. 
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The sensitivity analysis of the IRR with respect to capacity and FIT is found in appendix 16 
for the V27 and appendix 17 for the V47. Overall, it is clear that a higher installed capacity 
generates higher returns, keeping FIT constant. Likewise, returns increase when the FIT 
increases, ceteris paribus. It is interesting to note the economies of scale present due to this 
“capacity effect”: the slope of returns as a function of the FIT increases with capacity. In other 
words, a facility with five V27 units will see its returns increase faster as a result of an 
increase in the FIT than a facility with just two units. This is present at both types of facilities 
(V27 and V47), as is shown represented in appendix 18.  
Going back to appendix 16, it can be observed that a facility with two or more V27 turbines, 
at the current FIT level of 8.53 PHP/kW, achieves at least the hurdle of 18% IRR. If facility 
only has one V27 turbine, it would only generate returns above 15% with a FIT of 8.75 
PHP/kW and 18% with a FIT of 9.75 PHP/kW. Furthermore, at a capacity of 1.125MW and 
above (meaning 5 or more units), an IRR of 18% is attainable with a FIT of only 7 or even 
6.75 PHP/kW, if 8 or more units are installed in the facility.   
In appendix 17 projections show a V47 plant will always surpass the hurdle rate of 18% with 
the exception of a one-turbine plant with a FIT under 5.25 PHP/kWh. At the current FIT level 
of 8.53 PHP/kW, a Wind for Prosperity site with V47 turbines can achieve an IRR of 37%-
51%, depending on capacity, making an excellent business case for WfP in the Philippines. 
Lastly, comparing the returns of both types of turbines, the increased returns due to the V47’s 
higher efficiency is clear. At a FIT of 8.5 PHP/kWh and approximate capacity of 2MW we 
can compare: 9-unit V27 plant generating an IRR of 26.5% and a 3-unit V47 plant generating 
48.2%. However, the implementation of a V47 turbine may not always be the optimal 
solution, due to land restrictions and overcapacity compared to local demand. 
In sum, this analysis concludes that there is in fact a business and financial case for Wind for 
Prosperity in the Philippines. Given the feed-in-tariffs currently in place, the project not only 
comes to aid in the government’s target of eradicating rural electrification, but it is also poised 
to generate returns which are competitive with the Mega-Watt wind farms emerging around 
the country, by given a return consistently above 18% for most scenarios.  
These two arguments – the policy landscape (e.g. fiscal incentives and official targets) and the 
projected returns with existing FIT – should be included in any investment pitch for Wind for 
Prosperity with potential investors. They complement the arguments of operational and CSR 
compatibility with the investors’ own businesses, already contemplated within stage 3 of the 
Business Project. All things considered, I feel the argument is now more robust than ever for a 
successful venture of Wind for Prosperity in the Philippines.  
Masters in Finance/CEMS MIM  João Filipe Martins da Rosa Matias #550 
April 2014  9/21 
 
III – Reflection on learning  
The qualitative nature of the BP made it a lot more focused on the actual process of achieving 
the deliverables than the effective final result. The coherence and thoroughness of the process 
(the “how”) would a priori guarantee a reasonable output (the “what”). Consequently, the 
applied knowledge from my Masters was more closely related with complementary skills, not 
direct hard knowledge obtained. In fact, all three phases of the BP were more about the ability 
to scrutinize, select and analyse publicly available data in order to make the most well-
informed decision possible. The ultimate goal was not an answer to a simple equation; it was 
a recommendation taking into account a multiplicity of variables with different weights.  
Nonetheless, in the first phase of the BP my bachelor in Economics was helpful in guiding me 
through the ranking of the initial 29 countries – which indicators to consider, where to collect 
the data, reliability of given sources and more. Furthermore, the practice and experience from 
my masters to most effectively communicate a dense amount of information into adequate 
graphics and into a synthesized message within appealing body of presentation. These habits 
aligned with the practice of delivering executive summaries, was central in building a strong 
slide deck for Phase 2 and 3, which agglomerated frightening amounts of information. 
By contrast, given the topic of the BP being so different from the usual workload during the 
Masters, I obtained new insights within the renewable energy sector (namely wind), the 
electricity sector and the policy frameworks in operation across many Asian countries. Phase 
3 of the project was especially interesting since it allowed us to put ourselves in the shoes of a 
potential investor and search for what drivers and rationale would lead them to fund a wind 
project. By contrast, this BP allowed for a more detailed analysis of the case of the 
Philippines and for a bigger insight – albeit confidential – into the capital requirements and 
financial hurdles this time from the perspective of the wind manufacturer itself.  
Regarding new methodologies and tools used, I would highlight the use of the PESTLE 
framework – unfamiliar to me until now – and the practice of keeping a Minutes of Meeting 
(MoM) to track the progress of the project. I hadn’t yet realised the importance of keeping 
formal tracking systems regarding outputs and inputs of each involved party in the whole 
process of decision-making and meetings – a weakness I greatly improved upon during the 
BP. The MoM aided us in clarifying responsibilities and goals for each party, especially given 
the high amount of information flow between the team and Vestas following our meetings.  
The background diversity within the group (both origins and studies) created a challenging 
group dynamic to accommodate the different views and practices among ourselves. Given the 
different backgrounds, we all had different approaches to the depth of analysis required. I, as 
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a more detail-oriented, would end up agglomerating a lot of information outside the scope of 
the project and, by contrast, the member with an engineering background was very direct and 
simplistic in delivering his research and conclusions. We fed off each other to strive for the 
optimal middle ground, to guarantee a homogeneous and balanced final output.  
A positive aspect I was able to imprint on the team was my ability to build the presentation 
into a more convincing persuasive body. I was able to channel my experience acquired 
through the numerous case-study presentations, my internship and my teaching assistant role 
into a better outcome for the “how” side of the project. By contrast, I deeply learned from one 
of our members with 7 years of working experience who was more comfortable in asking 
things directly in the meetings with the company, allowing us to quickly clarify doubts.  
With the benefit of hindsight, I would deem the PESTLE analysis done in stage 2 as the least 
value-adding component. It seemed unimportant and not specifically relevant for the final 
output of the project, especially since we would be providing Vestas with something they 
already knew. We overcame this by communicating with them and understanding that they 
actually wanted a different perspective on all stages of the project. By contrast, Vestas’ 
availability and engagement with the project was the most value-adding aspect of our BP, 
clearly defining the scope and expectations of the project from the first meeting. Furthermore, 
it is rewarding to see that our output – both the BP and the Return Sensitivity analysis – will 
serve as a benchmark for future market analyses/prospection done within Vestas for WfP. 
Despite my satisfaction with the outcome of the project as a whole, there is always room for 
improvement. The investor selection process could be improved, namely in diminishing its 
exposure to the unpredictability of the available data for local companies in under developed 
countries. This hampers and biases the results towards firms for which we find the necessary 
information (e.g.CSR programs, sustainability reports, location of operations) – possibly 
resulting in the exclusion of worthy candidates for which no public information was found. In 
this sense, it would have been interesting to have an intermediary meeting with Vestas 
halfway through phase 3 to discuss their own insider knowledge regarding local companies, to 
provide us more on-field orientation. Despite this, the final list of selected firms were very 
much in line with what the company had in mind from their businesses in these countries. 
In sum, it comes to show that no complete market analysis can be done by simply sitting 
behind a computer and analysing data; a hands-on approach is still required to get a broad 
understanding of the potential investors’ availability and interest. It is naturally beyond the 
scope (and budget) of a short-term project such as the one at hand. Nevertheless, one should 
always bear in mind that the story on paper may be very different to the one in practice!  
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Appendices: 
Appendix 1 – Market Share of players top in the wind industry (2010-2013) 
 
Appendix 2 – Production sites of Vestas Wind Systems A/S as of Dec 2013 
 
Source: Vestas Investor Presentation 
Appendix 3 – Financial data for Vestas (2009-2013)  
Values in M EUR 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Market Cap  8646 4794 1687 864 4333* 
Revenue 5079 6920 5836 7216 6084 
Net Income  125 156 -166 -963 -82 
Employees (#) 20730 23252 22721 17778 15497 
Order intake (MW) 3072 8673 7397 3738 5964 
* On 24 April 2014, Vestas’ market cap was €7019.5M 
Source: Bloomberg; Vestas Investor Presentation 
Vestas 1 13.1% 2 14.0% 1 12.7% 1 14.8%
Xinjiang Goldwind 2 11.0% 7 6.0% 3 8.7% 4 9.5%
Enercon 3 9.8% 5 8.2% 5 7.8% 5 7.2%
Siemens 4 7.4% 3 9.5% 9 6.3% 9 5.9%
GE 5 6.6% 1 15.5% 6 7.7% 3 9.6%
* Source: BTM Consulting
° Sources: Cleantech Investor, IHS Emerging Energy; BTM Consult; MAKE
2010°2011°2012*2013*
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Appendix 4 – Average selling price of an order intake at Vestas 
 
Source: Vestas, Investors presentation 
Appendix 5 – Energy generation in OECD and non-OECD countries (2000-2020) 
 
Source: World Bank WDI (May 2013) for actuals; OECD WEO 2012 for projections; Vestas 
Appendix 6 – US energy forecasts of new capacity additions/removals (MW, 2015-2030)
 
Source: DB Climate Change Advisors; Vestas 
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Appendix 7 – Overview of the process of the Business Project  
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Appendix 8 – Summary table of potential investors identified for WfP in target countries 
 
  
Bharti Airtel Essar Oil Hira Godawari Indian Oil
Wipro
Mahindra                          
& Mahindra
Tata Docomo BSNL
Pakistan          
Petroleum
Fauji                       
Fertilizer
ENI S.p.a.
Lotte Chemical 
Pakistan
Engro Corp
Mari                    
Petroleum
Millat Group of 
Companies
PTCL
Total SA
Telenor                      
Group
Proximity            
Designs
Caterpillar
Aboitiz                  
Power
First Gen                           
& EDC*
Ayala Land Semirara Mining
Petron Corp
Global Business      
Power Corp
Vinamilk
Minh Phu               
Seafood Corp
VTI JSC Camimex
FPT Corp
Holcim                    
Vietnam
* Energy Development Corporation
** Vietnamese Business Council for Sustainable Development
Tier 2
Members of VBSCD**
Globe Telecom                     PLDT     
SM Prime Holdings
Du Pont
Nissan
India
Pakistan
Myanmar
Philippines
Vietnam
Tier 1 
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Appendix 9 – Fossil-fuel subsidy in Asian countries as percentage of GDP, 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Asian Development Outlook 2013: Asia's Energy Challenge 
 
Appendix 10 – Economic value of fossil-fuel subsidies by fuel in ASEAN  
Source: IEA WEO 2013 Special Report: Southeast Asia Energy Outlook 
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Appendix 11 – Fossil-fuel subsidy (% GDP, 2011) and Energy self-sufficiency index 
(forecast, 2035) 
 
Source: Asian Development Outlook 2013: Asia's Energy Challenge 
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Appendix 12 – Fossil-fuel subsidy (% GDP, 2011) and Energy self-sufficiency index 
(forecast, 2035) 
 
Source: IEA WEO 2013 Special Report: Southeast Asia 
 
Appendix 13 – Feed-in-tariffs in the Philippines 
  
Proposed                     
(NREB, Jul 2011) 
Approved                       
(ERC, Jul 2012) 
  PHP/kWh EUR/kWh* PHP/kWh EUR/kWh* 
Hydro 6.15 0.100 5.9 0.096 
Biomass 7 0.114 6.63 0.108 
Wind 10.37 0.168 8.53 0.138 
Solar 17.95 0.291 9.68 0.157 
*Exchange rate PHP/EUR of 0.0162 (as of 24 April 2014) 
Source: Energy Regulatory Commission of the Philippines 
Brunei Reach 10MW of solar PV capacity by 2030
Reduce energy intensity by 25% by 2030 compared with 2005
Cambodia 15% share of renewables in generation by 2015
Reduce energy demand intensity by 10% by 2030
Household grid electricity access of 70% by 70%
100% electricity access in any form for villages by 2020
Indonesia Reduce share of oil (to <25%) and natural gas (to 22%) in energy mix by 2025
Increase share of RE (>23%) and coal (>30%) in energy mix by 2025
99% household electrification rate by 2020
Fast Track Program 1 and 2: programs to increase power generation; 5 year behind schedule
Laos Build 5GW in hydropower and 1.9GW in coal-fired capacity by 2015
30% share of renewables in primary energy by 2025
Household electrification rate to 80% by 2015 and 90% by 2020
Malaysia Add 3.1GW of new capacity and replace 7.7GW by 2020
985MW installed RE capacity by 2015
13% of renewables in generation by 2030
Myanmar Share of renewables in generation to 15-18% by 2020
Reduction in primary energy consumption by 5% in 2020 and 8% by 2030
Philippines Increase generation capacity to 29GW in 2030 (16GW in 2011)
Reach 15GW of installed renewable capacity by 2030 (mostly geothermal and hydropower)
90% household electrification rate by 2017
100% sitio ("small-township") electrification by 2015
Singapore 5% peak electricity demand supplied by RE sources by 2020
Reduce energy intensity by 20% by 2020 and 35% by 2030 compared with 2005 levels
Thailand Increase generation capacity to 71GW in 2030
Increase share of RE in final consumption to 25% by 2021
Reduce energy intensity by 25% by 2030 compared with 2005 levels
Vietnam Increase generation capacity to 75GW by 2020 and 150GW by 2030
5% of renewables generation by 2020
100% rural household electrification by 2020
Energy policies
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Appendix 14 – Feed-in-tariffs across Wind for Prosperity target markets (EUR/kWh) 
 
 
Note: exchange rates applied at values of 24 April 2014 
Source: Various energy agencies, Wind-works.org 
 
 
Appendix 15 – Technical and Financial inputs used for the financial model of V27 and V47  
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Appendix 16 – Sensitivity analysis of WfP project IRR to number of V27-225kW units (capacity) and FIT (PHP/kWh) 
Appendix 17 – Sensitivity analysis of WfP project IRR to number of V47-660kW units (capacity) and FIT (PHP/kWh) 
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Appendix 18 – Graphical analysis of IRR sensitivity to FIT for multiple-sized facilities of V27 and V47 turbines 
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